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Abstract
Background
Introduction of Vibrio cholerae to Haiti during the deployment of United Nations (UN) peace-
keepers in 2010 resulted in one of the largest cholera epidemics of the modern era. Follow-
ing the outbreak, a UN-commissioned independent panel recommended three pre-
deployment intervention strategies to minimize the risk of cholera introduction in future
peacekeeping operations: screening for V. cholerae carriage, administering prophylactic
antimicrobial chemotherapies, or immunizing with oral cholera vaccines. However, uncer-
tainty regarding the effectiveness of these approaches has forestalled their implementation
by the UN. We assessed how the interventions would have impacted the likelihood of the
Haiti cholera epidemic.
Methods and Findings
We developed a stochastic model for cholera importation and transmission, fitted to
reported cases during the first weeks of the 2010 outbreak in Haiti. Using this model, we
estimated that diagnostic screening reduces the probability of cases occurring by 82%
(95% credible interval: 75%, 85%); however, false-positive test outcomes may hamper this
approach. Antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis at time of departure and oral cholera vaccination
reduce the probability of cases by 50% (41%, 57%) and by up to 61% (58%, 63%), respec-
tively. Chemoprophylaxis beginning 1 wk before departure confers a 91% (78%, 96%)
reduction independently, and up to a 98% reduction (94%, 99%) if coupled with vaccination.
These results are not sensitive to assumptions about the background cholera incidence
rate in the endemic troop-sending country. Further research is needed to (1) validate the
sensitivity and specificity of rapid test approaches for detecting asymptomatic carriage, (2)
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compare prophylactic efficacy across antimicrobial regimens, and (3) quantify the impact of
oral cholera vaccine on transmission from asymptomatic carriers.
Conclusions
Screening, chemoprophylaxis, and vaccination are all effective strategies to prevent cholera
introduction during large-scale personnel deployments such as that precipitating the 2010
Haiti outbreak. Antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis was estimated to provide the greatest pro-
tection at the lowest cost among the approaches recently evaluated by the UN.
Introduction
An estimated 1.4 billion people are at risk for cholera in countries across Africa, Asia, and
South and Central America where transmission is endemic [1]. In addition, explosive epidem-
ics can occur when cholera is introduced to non-endemic populations. One of the most severe
cholera epidemics of the modern era began in Haiti in 2010, causing over 700,000 reported
cases and nearly 9,000 deaths to date [2]. Prior to the outbreak, cholera had been absent from
Haiti for over a century [3]. Several pieces of evidence have contributed to widespread accep-
tance that the epidemic resulted from contamination of the Artibonite watershed with infected
sewage from a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) base [4]. The
causative Vibrio cholerae strain was imported from Nepal and diverged from strains circulating
in that country around the time 454 Nepalese troops were deployed to Haiti [5], and the first
cholera cases in Haiti were seen downstream from the base days after troops arrived [6].
Although preventing V. cholerae introduction is paramount for avoiding epidemics, there
are no established protocols utilizing biomedical interventions to prevent cholera importation
from endemic settings. An independent expert report to the United Nations (UN) following
the Haiti outbreak [7] advocated for three pre-deployment interventions to limit transmission
risk from peacekeepers: V. cholerae diagnostic screening, prophylaxis with antimicrobial che-
motherapies, and immunization using oral cholera vaccines (OCVs). Diagnostic screening and
antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis (a controversial control strategy amidst emerging drug resis-
tance [8,9]) aim to decrease the risk of an infected person traveling and shedding V. cholerae
on arrival. Antimicrobial drugs can also provide indirect protection against transmission by
hastening bacterial clearance or preventing infection among individuals exposed to V. cholerae.
OCVs, similarly, confer indirect protection by reducing bacterial output in stool [10,11].
Uncertainty about the extent to which these approaches reduce the risk for epidemic intro-
duction is a contributing factor in the recent decision by the UN against implementing the rec-
ommended interventions [12,13]. To provide support for policymakers weighing the benefits
of different approaches, we estimated how the proposed interventions would have influenced
the likelihood of the 2010 cholera epidemic in Haiti, compared the costs associated with their
implementation, and assessed how the various approaches would benefit peacekeepers by
reducing their likelihood of suffering cholera.
Methods
Study Design
We compared interventions according to the probability for a symptomatic cholera case to
occur in the host community. To estimate this, we developed a stochastic model simulating the
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arrival of asymptomatically infected peacekeepers (or those with mild illness that would not
prevent them from being deployed) and dynamics of cholera transmission from the MINUS-
TAH base to the community under protocols in place as of October 2010. We used the model
to assess the extent to which the proposed interventions alter the likelihood and dynamics of
an introduced epidemic. Specifically, we quantified the impact of the interventions on the
probability for two events requisite to the establishment of an epidemic: (1) undetected impor-
tation of V. cholerae from the endemic source country (Nepal) to Haiti by an asymptomatically
infected peacekeeper and (2) transmission of V. cholerae from peacekeepers to the general
public.
We provide an expanded description of the methods, including relevant equations, in S1
Text. R (version 3.2.1) scripts for implementing the model and related analyses are publicly
available at https://github.com/joelewnard/choleraHaiti.git.
Probability of Cholera Importation
Background incidence rate. The number of peacekeepers who were infected upon arrival
at the MINUSTAH base is unknown. We inferred probability distributions for the prevalence
of asymptomatic V. cholerae infection and incubation among peacekeepers at time of deploy-
ment based on background incidence rates reflecting potential transmission exposures experi-
enced during their 10-d leave period preceding deployment (S1 Text §1.1). The annual,
underreporting-adjusted incidence of cholera among Nepalese adults was previously estimated
to be 1.8 cases per 1,000 persons [1]. In view of uncertainty associated with such estimates
resulting from seasonal and geographic variation in incidence, we additionally modeled scenar-
ios considering background incidence rates of 0.5, 1, 2, 5, and 10 cases annually per 1,000
persons.
Estimating symptom probability in an endemic setting. We inferred the prevalence of
asymptomatic infection among peacekeepers via a meta-analysis of six epidemiological field
studies that monitored the onset of symptomatic and asymptomatic V. cholerae shedding
among household and community contacts of cholera patients (S1 Text §1.2) [14–19]. Since
studies reported the number of contacts who experienced symptomatic and asymptomatic
infections, the Beta distribution provided a direct way to compare study-level symptom proba-
bilities based on available data; for each study i, we took the symptom probability σi to be Beta-
distributed with the parameters αi and βi representing the number of new symptomatic and
asymptomatic V. cholerae infections reported among contacts of index cases. The expected val-
ues and variances of the log-transformed symptom probability for each study were obtained as
E½lnðsiÞ ¼ cðaiÞ  cðai þ biÞ
for the digamma function ψ(x), and
V½lnðsiÞ ¼ c1ðaiÞ  c1ðai þ biÞ
for the trigamma function ψ1(x). We pooled the log-transformed means in an inverse variance-
weighted random effects model to fit the distribution of the population parameter ln(σ) across
studies using the metafor (version 1.9–4) package in R [20]. This approach resulted in an esti-
mate that 24.2% (95% credible interval [CrI]: 14.4%, 40.7%) of cholera infections in an endemic
setting were symptomatic (S1 Table).
Modeling importation. The peacekeeping battalion departed Nepal on October 7, arriv-
ing in Haiti on October 8 and entering the MINUSTAH base on October 9 [6,7]. We accounted
for natural clearance of infection and intervention effects over the 2 d peacekeepers were in
transit when estimating the prevalence of infection upon arrival at the MINUSTAH base. We
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modeled the time spent incubating and shedding V. cholerae as exponentially-distributed ran-
dom variables. The probability for an individual peacekeeper to shed V. cholerae following
arrival was equivalent to the probability that clearance had not occurred during transit, condi-
tioned on having departed while incubating or asymptomatically shedding V. cholerae (S1 Text
§1.3, 1.4).
We calibrated the model to replicate epidemiological observations following the arrival of
differing numbers of infected peacekeepers, and we pooled outcome estimates according to a
binomial probability distribution for each initial number of infected peacekeepers under the
assumed background cholera incidence rates (S1 Text §1.1).
Model Outline
Following peacekeepers’ arrival at a MINUSTAH base that disposed untreated sewage into a
tributary of the Artibonite River, the early spread of cholera in central Haiti was mediated by
downstream transport of V. cholerae to the lower Artibonite basin. The majority of early cases
in this area were among individuals who farmed in rice fields adjacent to the Artibonite, drank
untreated water from the river and its canals, and practiced open defecation [6,21,22]. Tradi-
tional routes of local interpersonal spread facilitated slower dissemination of the epidemic
beyond the Artibonite basin [6,7]. Consequently, we modeled V. cholerae transmission via
river-mediated and local pathways, partitioning the population of Haiti into several groups
according to transmission exposures. The first group included persons in Artibonite River-
adjacent communes situated downstream from the MINUSTAH base, among whom we con-
sidered a small subgroup coming into direct contact with the river for water and sanitation
needs. The remaining population of Haiti, among whom we assumed no Artibonite exposure,
was affected only by local transmission.
Our model tracked a population of susceptible, latently infected, infectious, and recovered
persons, as well as an environmental reservoir of V. cholerae in the Artibonite watershed (S1
Text §3.1). We used a quantitative dose-response relation (S1 Text §3.2, 3.4) linking V. cholerae
exposure to individuals’ likelihood for infection and symptoms to account for variability in the
distribution of symptomatic cases during cholera epidemics [19], exemplified in the Haiti epi-
demic by the precipitous rise in symptomatic cases 2 wk following peacekeepers’ arrival (Fig 1).
The relative infectiousness of symptomatic and asymptomatic cases in the context of local
transmission is a source of uncertainty in cholera modeling [23,24]. Consequently, we cali-
brated the model using different log-linear relationships between stool output and infectious-
ness and verified that outcomes were not sensitive to our assumptions (S1 Text §3.4).
Model Calibration
We derived model parameters for cholera natural history and disease based on data from clini-
cal and epidemiological studies (Table 1). We propagated uncertainty in remaining parameters
by sampling from possible values using a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
approach, calibrating model output to data on suspected and confirmed cholera cases from all
ambulatory patients, hospital admissions, and deaths in Haiti from 16 October to 5 November
2010 (Table 2; S1 Text §4). The time period comprised the initial outbreak and its immediate
spread within and outside the Artibonite Valley, prior to a second phase in the epidemic associ-
ated with transmission increases attributed to Hurricane Tomas [25,26].
Interventions
We compared four interventions against status-quo protocols: (I) screening peacekeepers for
V. cholerae carriage at their time of departure from Nepal using a licensed, commercially-
Preventing Cholera during International Deployments
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Fig 1. Epidemiological dynamics.We illustrate model-data concordance by plotting case observations
(points) along with sample paths from stochastic realizations of the model (n = 100) under the status-quo
scenario used for fitting. We plot instances (n = 79) in which transmission ensued and omit those where no
epidemic occurred (n = 21). (A): Cases in the Artibonite-adjacent communes; (B): cases in all other
communes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.g001
Table 1. Fixed model parameters for cholera progression.
Parametera Definition Value Source
1/δ Mean incubation period (d) 1.55 [27]
1/γA Expected duration of carriage (d) 5.09 [28,29]
1/γD Expected duration of diarrhea (d) 3.32 [28–34]
1/γC Expected duration of convalescent phase 1.77 [30]
η Hyperinfectivity multiplier 100 [35–37]
ν Diarrheal relative stool volume (symptomatic case relative to asymptomatic carrier) 8.58 [33,38–40]
ξ Daily V. cholerae bacterial output 1b (Fixed)
κ V. cholerae dose with 50% infection probability 0.1b (Fixed)
ζ Case fatality rate 2.5% [6]
ΣJ N
(J) Population of Haiti (2010) 9,923,243 [41]
N(A) Population of Artibonite-adjacent communes (2010) 879,644 [6,41]
aParameters’ relation to cholera natural history and transmission is detailed S1 Text §3.1.
bEstimates for the cholera infectious dose have varied widely in volunteer challenge trials due to host-level factors as well as whether individuals ingested
V. cholerae with or without bicarbonate buffer solution, precluding numerical interpretation of the relation between the environmental exposure rate (βW), ξ,
and κ. As a flexible alternative to previous models that sought to quantify V. cholerae exposure directly, we fixed ξ and κ as numerical constants and
estimated βW values corresponding to exposure levels requisite for inducing infections as they were observed in Haiti.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t001
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available immunochromatographic rapid diagnostic test (RDT) following an enrichment step;
(IIa) administering antimicrobial chemotherapy at time of departure (time-of-departure pro-
phylaxis) or (IIb) beginning 7 d prior to departure (early-initiated prophylaxis); (III) immuniz-
ing peacekeepers using OCV administered beginning 5 wk before departure; and (IV)
combined immunization and chemoprophylaxis following the time-of-departure (IVa) and
early-initiated (IVb) schedules (Fig 2, Table 3).
We assessed the impact of the interventions on the probability for a symptomatic cholera
case to occur in the host community in Haiti.
Table 2. Estimated parameters for transmission dynamics in Haiti.
Parameter Definition Prior Source Estimatea,b
π Symptom probability (local transmission) Beta(263, 812)c [42,43] 0.241 (0.219, 0.267)
Log10(βW) Environmental V. cholerae exposure rate Unif(–1, –3) [23,44] –6.665 (–6.676, –6.653)d
βL Contact rate with V. cholerae carriers Unif(0.1, 0.6) 0.219 (0.184, 0.260)
k Scaling constant for local transmissione Unif(0, 106) 1201 (1010, 1413)
Log10(ω) Migration rate (d
–1) Unif(–2,–0.3) –1.314 (–1.331, –1.29)f
Log10(N
(W)/N(A)) Proportion exposed to Artibonite (of Artibonite-adjacent communes) Unif(–3, –1) [6,44] –1.618 (–1.630, –1.608)g
aEstimates are presented for the case r = Log10(ν) and the initial condition of one peacekeeper arriving infected. Estimates for differing r and initial
conditions are presented in S15 Table.
bEstimates are reported as median (95% CrI) describing the distribution generated by Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling.
cThe informative prior applied for estimating the symptom probability results from a serological survey measuring symptom probabilities during the initial
outbreak in the study region [43] (n = 948) and a challenge study estimating the probability for cholera-naïve individuals to experience symptoms when
exposed to V. cholerae [42] (n = 127), in contrast to the symptom probability for endemic settings estimated in S1 Table (S1 Text §4.2).
dExponentiated: (2.161 (2.108, 2.226)) × 10−7 per bacterial unit per day (see S1 Text §3.2).
eSmaller values represent more clustered local transmission, while larger values represent more homogeneous mixing (see S1 Text §3.2).
fExponentiated: 0.0485 (0.0467, 0.0507) per day.
gExponentiated: 0.0241 (0.0234, 0.0247)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t002
Fig 2. Intervention timeline. Events in 2010 are listed on the left alongside the timeframe for the simulated interventions: (I) RDT screening, (IIa) time-of-
departure prophylaxis with antimicrobial drugs, (IIb) early-initiated prophylaxis with antimicrobial drugs beginning 7 d prior to deployment, (III) two-dose OCV
immunization at 36 and 22 d prior to deployment, (IVa) two-dose OCV immunization combined with time-of-departure chemoprophylaxis, and (IVb) two-dose
OCV immunization combined with early-initiated chemoprophylaxis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.g002
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Status quo scenario. We assume the observed epidemic was representative of a status-quo
scenario entailing no testing, antimicrobial chemotherapy, or immunization among asymp-
tomatic peacekeepers, as per current (and 2010) pre-departure indications [7,12,13]. Existing
protocols include the isolation and clinical management of diarrheal cases. We assumed that
these measures are effective in limiting the risk for peacekeepers experiencing symptomatic
cholera during deployment to transmit infection under status quo. We consequently modeled
the impact of interventions on the probability for transmission by asymptomatically infected
peacekeepers only.
Rapid diagnostic screening. Recommendations for the UN to screen departing peace-
keepers are most likely to be implemented using rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs), which are capa-
ble of detecting V. cholerae at low densities obtainable via rectal swabs of asymptomatic
carriers following brief (4–6h) enrichment [45,46]. Alternative methods for identifying V. cho-
lerae among asymptomatic carriers, such as culture or polymerase chain reaction, may be
impractical by comparison for routine peacekeeping operations because individuals may
acquire or clear infection in the time required for diagnosis (24–72h), and/or because of limited
laboratory facilities in many cholera-endemic settings [47]. We used previous sensitivity and
specificity estimates for the leading licensed, commercially-available RDT (Crystal VC, Span
Diagnostics, Surat, India) following an enrichment step (“confirmation method” [45]) to quan-
tify the impact of screening on the probability for infected cholera-infected peacekeepers to be
deployed (S1 Text §2.2). The confirmation method yields higher specificity than direct stool
screening via the dipstick. We conducted further analyses considering sensitivities and specific-
ities ranging from 50% to 99% to examine the range of plausible outcomes under different
point-of-departure screening protocols.
Antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis. Numerous antimicrobial drugs are efficacious for
cholera treatment and prophylaxis. We used estimates from meta-analyses [9,30] aggregated
across antimicrobial drug classes to quantify two correlates of protection: (1) reduced risk for
infection, and (2) shortened duration of shedding given infection (S1 Text §2.3). We consid-
ered two drug administration schedules. The first was a typical prophylaxis approach begin-
ning at the time of departure from Nepal (IIa; “time-of-departure” prophylaxis), intended to
hasten clearance of infection among peacekeepers who acquired infection during their leave
period. Shown to be particularly effective in an early trial [48], the second (IIb; “early-initiated”
prophylaxis) was to administer prophylaxis beginning 7 d prior to deployment, which would
both hasten clearance and prevent V. cholerae infection in the days leading up to departure.
Table 3. Individual-level intervention efficacy.
Parameter Definition Valuea Source
Φ Relative infectiousness of OCV recipients (relative to unvaccinated asymptomatic carriers) 0.0097–0.5 (varied); 0.0194
(Main Text)
[11]
Se RDT sensitivity (enriched rectal swab method)b,c 96.0% (89.4%, 99.1%) [45]
Sp RDT specificity (enriched rectal swab method)b,c 92.4% (85.0%, 97.5%) [45]
υAbx Relative risk for cholera shedding (cholera-exposed persons receiving prophylaxis relative to
non-recipients)
34.3% (18.1%, 65.3%) [9]
1/γA− 1/
γAbx
Reduction in duration of shedding (d) (prophylaxed persons experiencing shedding relative to
non-prophylaxed infected individuals)
2.74 (2.40, 3.07) [30]
aValues are presented as median (95% CrI) based on distributions measured in cited studies or inferred from the reported data. We propagated
uncertainty in intervention efficacy by population simulations with Monte Carlo draws from the estimated or reported distributions.
bTest sensitivity and specificity are assumed to follow Beta distributions inferred by the approach described in S1 Text (§2.2).
cSensitivity and specificity are calculated for the cholera O1 dipstick test and compared to culture as a gold standard.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t003
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Emergence of resistance to conventional cholera therapies, such as tetracycline,
doxycycline, and ciprofloxacin, undermines interpretation of antimicrobial drug efficacies
reported in earlier trials [9,30]. We therefore assessed how externalities such as reduced anti-
microbial susceptibility may limit the effectiveness of chemoprophylaxis interventions by
conducting a sensitivity analysis, considering that conventional antimicrobial agents con-
ferred 10% to 50% lower-than-reported efficacy. While resistance to azithromycin is less
prevalent and single-dose regimens of this drug have shown superiority over conventional
therapies for cholera treatment [30,49], the efficacy of azithromycin prophylaxis has not
been studied. We also assessed the potential utility of azithromycin under a time-of-depar-
ture single-dose regimen assuming 10%–50% superior prophylactic efficacy over conven-
tional therapies.
Oral cholera vaccination. Although OCVs do not necessarily protect recipients against
cholera infection, they reduce density of V. cholerae in stool and reduce an individual’s likeli-
hood for experiencing disease given that infection occurs [10,11]. We modeled reductions in
bacterial shedding among asymptomatic peacekeepers resulting from immunization with two
doses of killed bivalent whole-cell OCV (Shanchol, Shantha Biotechnics, Hyderabad, India),
administered beginning 5 wk before departure, to compare transmission risk from immunized
and non-immunized peacekeepers who experience asymptomatic infection (S1 Text §2.4).
While numerical reductions in excreted V. cholerae density among OCV recipients have been
reported in a challenge trial [11], there is uncertainty in the quantitative relation between total
excreted V. cholerae and transmission risk [23]. We therefore conducted a sensitivity analysis
comparing effectiveness estimates assuming differing levels of protection against transmission
conferred by OCV.
Current and next-generation OCVs, including recombinant live vaccines (e.g., CVD
103-HgR), may confer some protection against infection in addition to reducing bacterial shed-
ding among recipients [11,50,51]. Considering this possibility, we performed an additional sen-
sitivity analysis considering potential outcomes of OCV interventions when vaccines were
modeled to prevent a proportion (5%, 10%, 25%, or 50%) of recipients from experiencing infec-
tion, in addition to conferring reductions in shedding among recipients who become infected.
Combined antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis and immunization. We assessed the effec-
tiveness of a combined intervention where peacekeepers received two doses of OCV beginning
5 wk before departure as well as either early-initiated or time-of-departure antimicrobial che-
motherapy. Under such an intervention, peacekeepers’ likelihood for experiencing shedding
upon arrival and rate of clearing V. cholerae infection were determined using the parameters
for antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis interventions described above. Peacekeepers were
assumed to shed V. cholerae at reduced densities due to vaccine receipt, as for the OCV
interventions.
Benefit to peacekeepers. In addition to assessing how the interventions under consider-
ation affect the probability for asymptomatic peacekeepers to import and transmit V. cholerae,
we estimated how antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis and OCV immunization benefit peace-
keeping forces by lowering individuals’ risk for experiencing symptomatic cholera disease. We
estimated these reductions using outcomes of previous studies that assessed direct effects of
antimicrobials and OCV in preventing (1) V. cholerae infection, and (2) cholera symptoms
given that infection occurs [9,11,52].
Intervention costs. We estimated the direct costs of the interventions in terms of the cost
per peacekeeper of purchasing the necessary tests, drugs, or vaccine doses, excluding additional
indirect costs associated with delivery and implementation. We considered the most recently-
reported manufacturer prices for RDTs and generic antibiotics [53]. We assessed OCV costs
based on reported per-dose pricing for the global OCV stockpile [54].
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Model Implementation
To incorporate measures of uncertainty resulting from model parameterization and the sto-
chastic nature of transmission, we implemented the model using the Gillespie algorithm (S1
Text §3.8), sampling fitted parameter values from their posterior distribution inferred by
MCMC [55]. We propagated uncertainty in screening and chemoprophylaxis intervention effi-
cacy via Monte Carlo sampling from the fitted distributions in stochastic model realizations.
We computed probabilities for a symptomatic cholera case in the Haitian population (after
which a large epidemic was likely to occur) as the proportion of model realizations in which a
case occurred prior to the extinction of V. cholerae transmission. We calculated relative risk
estimates comparing probabilities under intervention scenarios against status quo. Due to the
computationally-intensive nature of the model, we generated 95% credible intervals surround-
ing effect size estimates via bootstrap resampling. We carried out computations on the Louise
High-Performance Computing Cluster at Yale University.
Results
Infectious Arrivals
The estimated prevalence of asymptomatic V. cholerae infection and incubation among peace-
keepers at their time of deployment ranged from 2.9 (1.3, 5.5) to 57.4 (26.2, 110.6) per 100,000
for background incidence rates of 0.5 to 10 cases per 1,000 person-years at risk (PYAR) (S2
Table). Allowing for cholera progression during transit to the MINUSTAH base, we estimated
the prevalence of V. cholerae carriage among arrivals to range from 1.8 (0.8, 3.4) to 35.4 (16.2,
68.2) per 100,000 (S2 Table). These estimates corresponded to a probability of between 0.8%
(0.4%, 1.6%) and 14.8% (7.0%, 26.9%), respectively, for at least one of the 454 peacekeepers to
have been infected upon arrival at the MINUSTAH base (Table 4).
Table 4. Importation probabilities under status quo and intervention scenarios, with estimated effectiveness against importation.
Intervention Outcome measure
(%)a
Background cholera incidence rate
0.5/1,000
PYAR
1.0/1,000
PYAR
1.8/1,000
PYARb
2.0/1,000
PYAR
5.0/1,000
PYAR
10.0/1,000
PYAR
Status quo Probability 0.8 (0.4, 1.6) 1.6 (0.7, 3.1) 2.9 (1.3, 5.4) 3.2 (1.4, 6.1) 7.7 (3.6, 14.5) 14.8 (7.0,
26.9)
RDT screening Probability 0.2 (0.1, 0.3) 0.3 (0.1, 0.6) 0.5 (0.2, 1.1) 0.6 (0.3, 1.2) 1.5 (0.7, 2.9) 2.9 (1.3, 5.8)
Effectiveness 81.7 (76.1,
84.5)
81.7 (76.0,
84.5)
81.6 (75.9,
84.4)
81.5 (75.9,
84.4)
81.2 (75.4,
84.1)
80.5 (74.5,
83.6)
Time-of-departure
prophylaxis
Probability 0.5 (0.2, 1.0) 1.0 (0.4, 1.9) 1.7 (0.7, 3.7) 1.9 (0.9, 3.8) 4.8 (2.2, 9.1) 9.3 (4.3, 17.4)
Effectiveness 39.3 (30.9,
47.1)
39.2 (30.8,
47.0)
39.0 (30.5,
46.9)
39.0 (30.5,
46.9)
38.4 (29.7,
46.6)
37.4 (28.3,
46.0)
Early-initiated prophylaxis Probability 0.1 (0.0, 0.3) 0.2 (0.1, 0.6) 0.3 (0.1, 1.0) 0.4 (0.1, 1.1) 0.8 (0.3, 2.8) 1.7 (0.5, 5.5)
Effectiveness 89.1 (74.0,
95.0)
89.0 (74.0,
95.0)
89.0 (73.8,
94.9)
88.9 (73.8,
94.9)
88.7 (73.3,
94.8)
88.3 (72.3,
94.6)
PYAR: person-years at risk (incidence rate denominator).
aReported probabilities refer to the likelihood that at least one peacekeeper in a battalion of 454 arrives experiencing asymptomatic infection after 2 d in
transit from a source country with the designated background cholera incidence rate. Effectiveness is defined as the reduction in this probability relative to
its estimate under status quo protocols. Estimates are reported as median (95% CrI), as obtained via the binomial distribution parameterized according to
the procedures described in S1 Text §1.1.
bThe incidence of cholera among adults in Nepal was previously estimated to be 1.8/1,000 PYAR [1].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t004
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Epidemiological Dynamics
We estimated the basic reproductive number (R0) at the outset of the epidemic to have been
1.80 (1.64, 2.00) within Artibonite-adjacent communes and 1.13 (0.98, 1.34) nationwide
assuming a background cholera incidence rate of 1.8 per 1,000 PYAR in Nepal (S1 Text §3.9)
(Table 5). This value defined the number of secondary cases an index case was expected to
cause in the fully susceptible population, and did not vary significantly across the incidence
rates considered (Table 5) or among fitted models that assumed a different relationship
between stool output and infectiousness (S13 Table). Quantifying the contributions of the
modeled transmission pathways, we estimated the reproductive number for Artibonite-medi-
ated V. cholerae transport was 30.24 (30.03, 30.44), while most transmission occurred via
slower local spread with a reproductive number equal to 1.07 (0.91, 1.27). Cholera cases were
expected to occur in the community with 82.2% (81.2%, 83.2%) probability following the
arrival of one infected peacekeeper, and with over 95% probability following the arrival of two
or more infected peacekeepers (Table 6).
Pooling case probabilities according to the likelihood for one, two, or three peacekeepers
arriving infected (S3 Table; S1 Text §1.1), we estimated the total probability for community
cases ranged from 0.7% (0.3%, 1.3%) to 12.4% (5.8%, 22.4%) under the different background
incidence rates modeled. This outcome did not depend on the modeled relationship between
shedding rates and infectiousness among symptomatic and asymptomatic peacekeepers (S14
Table 5. Estimated basic reproduction numbers (R0).
Initial conditions Basic reproduction number (R0) estimate
Geographical area Transmission pathway
Artibonite
communes
Nationwide River-mediated Local
Number of infected arrivalsa 1 1.80 (1.64, 2.01) 1.14 (0.97,
1.34)
30.29 (30.09,
30.50)
1.07 (0.91,
1.28)
2 1.59 (1.44, 1.79) 0.97 (0.82,
1.17)
26.65 (26.48,
26.83)
0.91 (0.76,
1.11)
3 1.48 (1.36, 1.66) 0.89 (0.77,
1.07)
24.68 (24.52,
24.83)
0.83 (0.71,
1.02)
Background cholera incidence
rateb
0.5/1,000 PYAR 1.80 (1.64, 2.01) 1.14 (0.97,
1.34)
30.27 (30.07,
30.48)
1.07 (0.91,
1.28)
1.0/1,000 PYAR 1.80 (1.64, 2.01) 1.14 (0.98,
1.34)
30.26 (30.06,
30.47)
1.07 (0.91,
1.28)
1.8/1,000 PYAR (WHO
est.)c
1.80 (1.64, 2.00) 1.13 (0.98,
1.34)
30.24 (30.03,
30.44)
1.07 (0.91,
1.27)
2.0/1,000 PYAR 1.80 (1.64, 2.00) 1.14 (0.98,
1.34)
30.23 (30.02,
30.44)
1.07 (0.91,
1.27)
5.0/1,000 PYAR 1.79 (1.64, 1.99) 1.13 (0.97,
1.33)
30.14 (29.91,
30.36)
1.07 (0.91,
1.26)
10.0/1,000 PYAR 1.79 (1.63, 1.97) 1.13 (0.97,
1.31)
29.99 (29.68,
30.25)
1.06 (0.91,
1.25)
PYAR: person-years at risk (incidence rate denominator).
aR0 estimates are reported as median (95% CrI) from the posterior distribution of the parameters fitted under assumptions of one, two, or three infected
peacekeepers at the outset of the epidemic. We derive the formula for R0 via the next-generation matrix approach of [56] (S1 Text §3.9).
bIncidence-rate-specific R0 estimates are obtained by pooling estimates across parameter sets according to the binomial probabilities of one, two, or three
infected peacekeepers arriving (S1 Text §1.1).
cThe incidence of cholera among adults in Nepal was previously estimated to be 1.8/1,000 PYAR [1].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t005
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Table). The timing of the first symptomatic case was subject to variability across stochastic
realizations of the model (95% CrI: October 11 to October 20) (Fig 1). The first symptomatic
case is reported to have occurred October 12 [57]; our model predicts a case on or before this
date in 24% of simulations, whereas 71% of simulations predict a case on or before October 14,
which is the date of symptoms onset for the first culture-confirmed cholera cases identified by
a Cuban medical brigade that investigated the outbreak early in its course (S1 Text §4.5) [6].
Intervention Effects
Using RDTs with an enrichment step to screen for and exclude potential cholera carriers from
transiting to Haiti conferred an 81.6% (75.9%, 84.4%) reduction in the probability for V. cho-
lerae importation at the assumed background incidence rate of 1.8 cases per 1,000 PYAR
(Table 4, Table 7). However, under such a screening program, 7% (2%, 15%) of tests adminis-
tered (33 [10, 70] peacekeepers in a battalion of 454) were expected to result in false positive
outcomes. Reductions in importation probabilities and expected false-positive rates did not
vary significantly across the range of background incidence rates considered (S4 and S5
Tables). A point-of-departure screening approach with 99% sensitivity and specificity would
reduce the importation probability by up to 83% relative to status quo, with 0.9% of tests (4 of
454) returning false-positive results.
Early-initiated antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis offered marginally superior protection
against importation, reducing the probability of at least one infected peacekeeper arriving by
89.0% (73.8%, 94.9%). In contrast, prophylaxis delivered at time of departure reduced the
importation probability by only 39.0% (30.5%, 46.9%) (Table 4). Accounting for both protec-
tion against importation as well as reduced opportunities for transmission due to faster clear-
ance of infection among treated peacekeepers, antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis was expected
to reduce the probability for a case by 49.9% (42.7%, 56.4%) when administered at time of
departure, or by 91.0% (78.5%, 95.9%) if treatment were initiated 1 wk before departure
(Table 7).
OCV immunization reduced the probability for a case in the community by up to 60.8%
(59.1%, 62.4%). Concurrent OCV immunization and antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis resulted
Table 6. Case probabilities following importation by one, two, or three peacekeepers.
Intervention Outcome measure (%)a,b Infectious arrivalsc
1 2 3
Status quo Case probability 82.2 (81.1, 83.2) 95.9 (95.3, 96.4) 99.1 (98.9, 99.4)
Antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis (ACP)d Case probability 67.5 (66.2, 68.8) 87.8 (86.8, 88.7) 95.4 (94.8, 96.0)
Effectiveness 17.8 (16.0, 19.8) 8.4 (7.4, 9.5) 3.8 (3.2, 4.4)
Oral cholera vaccination (OCV) Case probability 32.1 (30.8, 33.4) 49.9 (48.5, 51.3) 59.8 (58.5, 61.2)
Effectiveness 61.0 (59.3, 62.7) 47.9 (46.4, 49.4) 39.6 (38.3, 41.0)
Combined ACPd and OCV Case probability 17.3 (16.3, 18.4) 29.7 (28.5, 31.0) 38.3 (36.9, 39.6)
Effectiveness 78.9 (77.6, 80.2) 69.0 (67.7, 70.3) 61.4 (60.0, 62.7)
aThe case probability outcome measure is defined as the likelihood for at least one symptomatic cholera case to occur among members of the host
community following arrival of one, two, or three infected peacekeepers.
bEffectiveness is defined as the reduction in this probability relative to its estimate under status quo.
cEstimates are reported as median (95% CrI), as obtained via bootstrap resampling.
dEstimates apply to both early-initiated and time-of-departure chemoprophylaxis schedules; the rate at which prophylaxed individuals clear infection is the
same under both schedules, whereas the interventions differ in probabilities for arrival of one, two, or three infected peacekeepers
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t006
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in up to 87.1% (85.1%, 88.9%) and 97.7% (94.5%, 98.9%) reductions in the probability for a
case under time-of-departure and early-initiated treatment regimens, respectively.
We found that the effectiveness of immunization was highly sensitive to the modeled level
of protection resulting from OCV-mediated reductions in shedding. If vaccination reduces the
risk of transmission from an asymptomatically infected individual by less than 96% (ϕ =
0.0388), OCV interventions cease to be more effective than time-of-departure chemoprophy-
laxis. Even assuming reductions in transmission risk greater than 99% (ϕ = 0.0097), OCV inter-
ventions offered lower effectiveness than screening and early-initiated prophylaxis (S7 Table).
At reported levels of reductions in bacterial shedding (ϕ = 0.0194) [11], OCV interventions
offered comparable effectiveness (>80% reduction in case probability) to screening and early-
initiated prophylaxis only if we assumed vaccination reduces the probability of any infection
by 50% (S16 Table).
In contrast, antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis remained effective when considering potential
limitations that could undermine this approach. Early-initiated chemoprophylaxis showed
superior effectiveness over RDT screening when we assumed up to 25% lower-than-reported
Table 7. Total reduction in case probability afforded by interventions, with estimated intervention effectiveness.
Outcome
measure (%)a,b
Background
cholera incidence
rate
Status
quo
Rapid diagnostic
testing (RDT)
Antimicrobial
chemoprophylaxis (ACP)
Oral cholera
vaccine (OCV)
Combined ACP and OCV
Time-of-
departure
Early-
initiated
Time-of-
departure
Early-
initiated
Case probability 0.5/1000 PYAR 0.7 (0.3,
1.3)
0.1 (0.1, 0.2) 0.3 (0.1, 0.7) 0.1 (0.0,
0.2)
0.3 (0.1, 0.5) 0.1 (0.0, 0.2) 0.02
(0.004,
0.05)
1.0/1000 PYAR 1.3 (0.6,
2.5)
0.2 (0.1, 0.5) 0.7 (0.3, 1.4) 0.1 (0.0,
0.4)
0.5 (0.2, 1.0) 0.2 (0.1, 0.4) 0.03 (0.01,
0.1)
1.8/1000 PYARc 2.3 (1.1,
4.5)
0.4 (0.2, 0.9) 1.2 (0.5, 2.5) 0.2 (0.1,
0.7)
0.9 (0.4, 1.8) 0.3 (0.1, 0.6) 0.1 (0.0,
0.2)
2.0/1000 PYAR 2.6 (1.2,
5.0)
0.5 (0.2, 1.0) 1.3 (0.5, 2.8) 0.2 (0.1,
0.8)
1.0 (0.5, 2.0) 0.3 (0.1, 0.7) 0.1 (0.0,
0.2)
5.0/1000 PYAR 6.4 (3.0,
11.9)
1.2 (0.5, 2.4) 3.2 (1.3, 6.7) 0.6 (0.2,
1.9)
2.5 (1.2, 4.8) 0.8 (0.3, 1.8) 0.2 (0.0,
0.5)
10.0/1000 PYAR 12.4 (5.8,
22.4)
2.4 (1.1, 4.8) 6.4 (2.6,
13.0)
1.2 (0.3,
3.8)
5.0 (2.3, 9.2) 1.7 (0.7, 3.5) 0.3 (0.1,
1.0)
Effectiveness 0.5/1000 PYAR 81.7 (76.1, 84.5) 50.1 (43.1,
56.5)
91.0 (78.7,
95.9)
60.9 (59.3,
62.6)
87.2 (85.2,
89.0)
97.7 (94.5,
98.9)
1.0/1000 PYAR 81.7 (76.1, 84.5) 50.0 (42.9,
56.5)
91.0 (78.6,
95.9)
60.9 (59.2,
62.5)
87.2 (85.2,
89.0)
97.7 (94.5,
98.9)
1.8/1000 PYARc 81.6 (76.0, 84.4) 49.9 (42.7,
56.4)
91.0 (78.5,
95.9)
60.8 (59.1,
62.4)
87.1 (85.1,
88.9)
97.7 (94.5,
98.9)
2.0/1000 PYAR 81.6 (75.9, 84.4) 49.8 (42.7,
56.4)
90.9 (78.5,
95.8)
60.7 (59.1,
62.4)
87.1 (85.0,
88.9)
97.7 (94.5,
98.9)
5.0/1000 PYAR 81.3 (75.6, 84.2) 49.3 (41.9,
56.2)
90.8 (78.1,
95.8)
60.4 (58.7,
62.0)
87.9 (84.7,
88.8)
97.6 (94.3,
98.9)
10.0/1000 PYAR 80.7 (74.8, 83.7) 48.5 (40.6,
55.8)
90.4 (77.5,
95.7)
59.7 (58.0,
61.5)
86.5 (84.1,
88.6)
97.6 (94.1,
98.9)
PYAR: person-years at risk (incidence rate denominator).
aCase probabilities refer to the likelihood that at least one symptomatic cholera case occurs in the community. Effectiveness is defined as the reduction in
this probability relative to its estimate under status quo protocols.
bEstimates are reported as median (95% CrI), as obtained via bootstrap resampling.
cThe incidence of cholera among adults in Nepal was previously estimated to be 1.8/1000 PYAR [1].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t007
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efficacy of antimicrobial drugs, as might be expected if resistance to first-line chemotherapies
or poor compliance with drug regimens limited this approach (S6 Table). Early-initiated che-
moprophylaxis remained superior to OCV interventions even when we assumed 50% lower-
than-reported efficacy for antimicrobial drugs. Under such conditions, we expected a 69.7%
(34.6%, 85.1%) reduction in the probability for a symptomatic cholera case.
Administering a single dose of azithromycin at time of departure was expected to offer supe-
rior effectiveness over screening and early-initiated prophylaxis with conventional therapies if
azithromycin offers a 50% improvement in protection against shedding onset and a 50%
greater reduction in the duration of shedding relative to conventional drugs (S8 Table). Even if
the efficacy of azithromycin is only 10% superior to conventional agents, time-of-departure
prophylaxis with this treatment offers a 56.6% (49.3%, 64.1%) reduction in the probability for a
case, nearly equal to the estimated effectiveness of OCV.
Benefit to Peacekeepers
Antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis and immunization with OCV directly benefit peacekeepers
from cholera-endemic settings by reducing their risk for experiencing symptomatic cholera ill-
ness. These benefits would also be afforded to peacekeepers traveling to endemic countries
where they may be exposed to cholera, with OCV offering longer-lasting protection. Based on
available studies (Table 8), we estimated that antimicrobial drugs lower the probability for
experiencing cholera diarrhea by 95.5% (70.4%, 99.9%) among peacekeepers exposed to V. cho-
lerae before deployment. OCV interventions are expected to reduce exposed peacekeepers’
probability for cholera diarrhea by 62.8% (22.2%, 90.0%). Combining chemoprophylaxis with
vaccination provides up to 98.0% (84.9%, 99.9%) protection against cholera diarrhea.
Intervention Costs
Antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis is the lowest-cost strategy under consideration (Table 9).
Early-initiated and time-of-departure chemoprophylaxis with conventional cholera therapies
each cost under US$1 per peacekeeper, while single-dose prophylaxis using azithromycin
would cost between US$0.52 and US$1.32 per peacekeeper. Although the direct cost of pur-
chasing RDTs is only moderately more expensive at US$2.54 per peacekeeper, there are addi-
tional indirect costs associated with training and employing personnel to take rectal swabs,
perform sample enrichment, and administer tests, which together may exceed the direct costs
of assays [58]. Delaying the deployment of peacekeepers who test positive for V. cholerae
imposes additional indirect costs and logistical burden, particularly if tests have low specificity
(S5 Table). Administering OCV is expected to cost US$3.70 per peacekeeper for the bivalent
vaccine without B subunit (Shancol), or between US$9.40 and US$18.80 for the vaccine con-
taining B subunit (Dukoral). Additional indirect costs associated with maintaining a cold chain
for shipment and storage of the vaccine [54] are not reflected in the unit price of vaccine doses.
Table 8. Benefit to peacekeepers.
Reduction in probability of cholera diarrhea (%)a Source
Antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis (ACP) 95.5 (70.4, 99.9) [9,52]
Oral cholera vaccine (OCV) 62.8 (22.2, 90.0) [11]
Combined ACP and OCV 98.0 (84.9, 99.9) [9,11,52]
aEstimates are reported as median (95% CrI) as estimated by the approach described in S1 Text (§2.5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t008
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Vaccine availability also presents a limitation to implementing OCV interventions. Of
104,928 active-duty UN peacekeeping personnel in 2015, 74% were deployed fromWHO-clas-
sified cholera-endemic countries. Considering most deployments are 6 mo long, over 310,000
OCV doses would be required to immunize peacekeepers departing endemic countries each
year, representing 16% of total annual production capacity for either Shanchol or Dukoral (2
million doses each as of 2012 [54]).
Discussion
The cholera outbreak in Haiti arose from a confluence of preventable circumstances. Systemic
inadequacies in sanitation infrastructure made Haiti vulnerable to water-borne disease [60],
like other disaster-affected settings where peacekeeping operations are undertaken. Mass per-
sonnel movements from a cholera-endemic country and deficient waste management practices
at a MINUSTAH base led to the introduction of V. cholerae to a susceptible population. Prior
to the outbreak, there were no biomedical interventions in place to prevent its occurrence
despite the recognized risk for spread of infectious diseases from military to civilian popula-
tions [61]. While the UN has been reluctant to implement interventions in the wake of the epi-
demic in part due to uncertainties surrounding their effectiveness [12,13], our findings suggest
antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis reduces the risk of disease introduction by over 90%. The low
costs and minimal logistical burden of chemoprophylaxis relative to the other interventions
Table 9. Intervention costs.
Intervention Method Direct cost per
peacekeepera,b
Indirect costs and considerations
Rapid diagnostic screening Crystal VC cholera dipstick (Span
Diagnostics, Surat, India)
US$2.54 [59] Direct costs do not include the cost of laboratory
personnel to perform sample enrichment and
rectal swabbing, which are likely to exceed the
cost of assays [58]. Additional costs or logistical
difficulties may result from preventing deployment
of peacekeepers with V. cholerae-positive test
results, particularly if test specificity is low.
Single-dose antimicrobial
chemotherapy at time of
departurec
Conventional antimicrobial agents
[9,30]
US$0.03–US$0.12
(Doxycycline); US$0.08–US
$0.40 (Ciprofloxacin) [53]
High compliance can be expected with a single-
dose regimen
Azithromycin US$0.52–US$1.32 [53]
Early-initiated antimicrobial
chemotherapy beginning 1 wk
prior to departured
3-d course with conventional
antimicrobial agents
US$0.24–US$0.48 [53] Lower treatment compliance may be expected if
peacekeepers are required to take therapies
during their leave period.
Oral cholera vaccine Killed bivalent whole-cell vaccine
without B subunit (Shanchol,
Shantha Biotechnics, Hyderabad,
India)
US$3.70 [54] Direct costs do not include those associated with
cold chain shipment and storage infrastructure.
Vaccine must be administered 5 wk before
departure (Fig 2). Vaccine supplies are limited;
the number of doses required to immunize at-risk
peacekeeping forces represents roughly 16% of
global production capacity for either vaccine as of
2012 [54].
Killed bivalent whole-cell vaccine
with B subunit (Dukoral, Janssen,
Inc., Toronto, Canada)
US$9.40–US$18.80 [54]
aCosts are presented in current US dollars.
bRanges represent lower bound–upper bound based on reported costs in the cited sources.
cSingle-dose antimicrobial regimens consider 300 mg of doxycycline (WHO recommendation [8]) and 1,000 mg of ciprofloxacin.
dEarly-initiated antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis consider 500 mg of tetracycline administered four times daily for 3 d (WHO recommendation [8]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.t009
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suggest this approach warrants consideration as a strategy to limit risk for cholera introduction
in future peacekeeping operations.
Prospective recommendations for OCV use during peacekeeping deployments had been in
place prior to the outbreak [62]. Our analysis suggests antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis of
peacekeepers beginning 1 wk prior to deployment is more effective than OCV in preventing
epidemic introduction, and is also less expensive and easier to implement. While screening via
RDTs offers similar levels of protection in comparison to early-initiated antimicrobial chemo-
prophylaxis, logistical and cost constraints must be considered in evaluating the two interven-
tion strategies. In contrast to conventional culture, administering RDTs using enriched rectal
swab samples is simple to perform outside laboratories and requires minimal personnel time.
However, false positive results are expected in large battalions even if the screening procedure
has high specificity, suggesting confirmatory diagnoses or provision of antimicrobial drugs
may be warranted for individuals with positive test outcomes. This logistical constraint was
acknowledged in a follow-up report by the UN [12,13]. Our analysis provides quantitative sup-
port for comparing the different interventions in terms of their impact on cholera transmis-
sion, and demonstrates that screening and OCV interventions would not surpass early-
initiated chemoprophylaxis in effectiveness.
Although effective, prophylactic use of antimicrobial drugs for cholera is controversial
[8,9,13]. Intensive population-wide tetracycline prophylaxis has been associated with local
emergence of drug resistance [63]. In addition, resistance to tetracycline derivatives is prevalent
in V. cholerae depending on geographical region [64]. Azithromycin is an attractive alternative:
a single-dose regimen is efficacious in resolving cholera diarrhea and pathogen excretion [49],
and resistance in V. cholerae is comparatively rare [65]. We found single-dose azithromycin to
be an optimal strategy if its superiority for cholera treatment translates to high prophylactic
efficacy. Furthermore, targeted chemoprophylaxis among strictly-defined groups such as
peacekeeping personnel imposes low or negligible selective pressure for drug resistance relative
to historical population-based approaches, and has been advocated as a cholera control strategy
[19,60]. To date, chemoprophylaxis studies have used differing drug classes and dosing, and
have measured bacteriological outcomes inconsistently [9]. Trials are needed to define optimal
antimicrobial regimens for cholera chemoprophylaxis. In view of prevalent resistance to con-
ventional therapies, assessing the prophylactic efficacy of azithromycin is of particular priority.
It is uncertain how many infected peacekeepers introduced cholera to Haiti. Considering a
wide range of possible incidence rates in Nepal, we identified statistical support for the hypoth-
esis that one infected peacekeeper initiated the outbreak (S3 Table), consistent with genomic
analyses supporting a single-source introduction [5,66,67]. There is no record of any peace-
keeper experiencing symptoms in Haiti or before departure, and V. cholerae was not detected
in personnel or camp sewage in October 2010 [6,7]. These factors suggest secondary genera-
tions of infection did not occur among peacekeepers. The high estimated R0 for river-mediated
transmission, underlying the observed incidence of over 2,000 symptomatic cases per day
nationwide by 22 October [6], distinguishes the Artibonite watershed as a high-risk environ-
ment for cholera introduction [25,60].
Previously-reported transmission models have not accounted for the dose-response rela-
tionship between V. cholerae exposure and the probability of symptoms in addition to infection
[38]. Our model links dose-response observations from human challenge experiments to tem-
poral variability in the distribution of symptomatic and asymptomatic infections [23]. This
approach provides a novel explanation for the explosive nature of cholera epidemics such as
the Haiti outbreak, and addresses previous uncertainty [6] as to how a small number of asymp-
tomatic peacekeepers could instigate a large outbreak despite low initial levels of V. cholerae
contamination. A quiescent initial increase in asymptomatic cases, which result from lower
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infectious doses, precedes the precipitous rise in observed cases in our model after a threshold
level of environmental contamination is reached.
We consider how the interventions affect transmission from asymptomatic peacekeepers
under the assumption that existing protocols for isolation and clinical management of diar-
rheal cases are effective in preventing symptomatic peacekeepers from transmitting. Because
deficient sanitation infrastructure at peacekeeping bases could undermine the effectiveness of
existing protocols, proper sewage disposal must be implemented in tandem with biomedical
interventions to limit risk for cholera introduction.
Our analysis is subject to several limitations. First, external factors affecting V. cholerae con-
centration in the environment mediate the relationship between bacterial shedding and trans-
mission risk [68], limiting our ability to infer how lower levels of V. cholerae shedding among
asymptomatic OCV recipients impact the relative transmission risk of immunized and non-
immunized asymptomatic carriers. Thus, our finding that the effectiveness of OCV varies
widely depending on the relationship between reduced bacterial shedding and transmission
risk undermines support for OCV as a preventive strategy (S8 Table). Our analysis did not con-
sider single-dose OCV administration [69,70], which may be more logistically feasible than
two-dose schedules given costs and limited vaccine stockpiles, or in the event that peacekeepers
are deployed on short notice during acute crises. In addition, evidence that the vaccine does
not confer direct protection against infection comes from limited studies; one recruited healthy
subjects with no previous cholera exposure [11], and the other reported incomplete details on
follow-up of asymptomatic individuals [10]. We found that OCV would deliver comparable
effectiveness to prophylaxis only if vaccines prevent 50% of infections in addition to reducing
bacterial shedding among recipients experiencing infection. Protection against infection there-
fore merits attention in studies of next-generation cholera vaccines including CVD 103-HgR.
Unlike antimicrobials that reduce overall risk of infection, OCV could marginally increase
peacekeepers’ risk of unknowingly importing V. cholerae by increasing the fraction of cases
that are asymptomatic.
Last, the UN has previously acknowledged that commercial RDTs have only been field-vali-
dated among symptomatic cholera cases [12,13]. Validation of RDTs for detecting V. cholerae
in enriched specimens from asymptomatic carriers is a research priority, as this approach
could greatly expand low-cost options for screening individuals at risk of transmission.
Together with cost and logistical considerations, uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of
OCV and screening interventions strengthens the case for chemoprophylaxis as the preferred
preventive strategy.
While the role of large-scale international personnel deployments in the global spread of
cholera and other infectious diseases is not known, exposure to infectious disease agents in
low-income countries that deploy and receive the majority of peacekeeping forces has moti-
vated previous calls for enhanced infectious disease surveillance among troops [61,71].
Whereas the previous absence of cholera from Haiti contributed to interest in ascertaining the
geographic origin of the 2010 epidemic [4], importation events affecting peacekeeper-receiving
countries where sporadic, epidemic, or endemic cholera transmission already occurs may be
less readily detected.
Inadequate water and sanitation facilities and the lack of population immunity to cholera in
Haiti put this country at exceptionally high risk for an epidemic following contamination of
the Artibonite watershed. However, UN peacekeeping missions serve populations affected by
geopolitical and humanitarian emergencies whose vulnerable living circumstances bring about
high risk for cholera transmission [60,72,73]. Although our model primarily offers a retrospec-
tive analysis of how several interventions might have led to different outcomes in Haiti, infer-
ences about the comparative effectiveness of the interventions are generalizable to other
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settings. In particular, estimated reductions in importation probability through screening and
prophylaxis hold for peacekeepers departing any country with endemic cholera transmission.
In this respect, we identify that these interventions offer at minimum 81% and 89% effective-
ness, respectively, against asymptomatic V. cholerae importation during future global deploy-
ments. As of 2015, over 75,000 UN peacekeeping personnel actively serving at international
missions were deployed fromWHO-classified cholera-endemic countries [1,74]. With opera-
tions at this scale, the risk for further importation events is high under existing protocols even
if individual peacekeepers or battalions have a low probability of carrying V. cholerae.
Troop-deploying countries are currently encouraged to provide OCVs to protect peacekeep-
ers against cholera during deployments to cholera-endemic countries [7,12,13]. Our finding
that biomedical interventions serve the dual purpose of reducing risk for cholera introduction
in troop-receiving countries suggests existing UN protocols are suboptimal. Chemoprophylaxis
with antimicrobial drugs, targeted judiciously to peacekeepers deployed from cholera-endemic
settings, offers superior protection against cholera introduction relative to immunization and
imposes lower costs and logistical burden than RDT-based screening or immunization with
OCV. Combined interventions utilizing OCV with chemoprophylaxis offer particularly high
effectiveness. Quantitative assessments provide support and guidance for policymakers weigh-
ing the merits and cost-sharing of different interventions.
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Editors' Summary
Background
Cholera—a bacterial gut infection caused by Vibrio cholerae—is a global killer. Epidemics
(outbreaks) of cholera in countries across Africa, Asia, and South and Central America
where cholera is endemic (always present) affect 1–4 million people and kill up to 142,000
people every year. People get cholera by eating food or drinking water contaminated with
feces from an infected person, so cholera epidemics occur in places with poor sanitation
such as refugee camps and in regions where an earthquake or another natural disaster has
disrupted water and sanitation systems. Most people who become infected with V. cho-
lerae have no or mild symptoms, but these asymptomatically infected individuals can shed
bacteria in their feces for up to 2 wk. Other infected people develop severe diarrhea, pro-
ducing profuse watery feces. The standard treatment for cholera is replacement of fluids
and salts lost through diarrhea with oral rehydration fluid or, in the worst cases, by fluid
replacement directly into a vein. If left untreated, patients with severe cholera can die from
dehydration within hours of developing symptoms.
WhyWas This Study Done?
In 2010, a large cholera epidemic affected Haiti, which had been free of cholera for more
than a century. This epidemic, which has resulted in nearly 9,000 deaths to date, was prob-
ably caused by contamination of water by infected sewage from the MINUSTAH (Mission
des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti) base, a UN peacekeeping mission estab-
lished in Haiti in 2004. In January 2010, a massive earthquake hit Haiti, and in October
that year, 454 troops from Nepal (a cholera-endemic country) were deployed to a MINUS-
TAH base in central Haiti as part of an ongoing peacekeeping operation to maintain politi-
cal stability. Following the Haiti cholera outbreak, a panel of experts recommended that
peacekeeping troops coming from countries where cholera is endemic should be screened
for V. cholerae carriage, treated prophylactically with antimicrobial drugs (prophylactic
treatments prevent a disease occurring), and/or immunized with oral cholera vaccines
before deployment. However, because of uncertainty about the effectiveness of these pre-
deployment intervention strategies, the UN has not implemented any of them. Here, the
researchers use computational modeling to investigate whether these interventions would
have prevented the Haiti cholera outbreak.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find?
The researchers developed a mathematical model to simulate the arrival of asymptomati-
cally infected peacekeepers (or those with mild illness that would not have prevented their
deployment) and the dynamics of cholera transmission from the MINUSTAH base to the
community. They used this model to investigate the effect of the three proposed pre-
deployment intervention strategies on (1) the probability of undetected importation of V.
cholerae from an endemic source country by an asymptomatically infected peacekeeper,
and (2) the subsequent probability of transmission of V. cholerae from peacekeepers to the
general public, two events needed to establish an epidemic. According to the model, diag-
nostic screening reduced the probability of cases occurring by 82%, whereas antimicrobial
chemoprophylaxis at the time of departure and oral cholera vaccination reduced the prob-
ability of cases by 50% and 61%, respectively. Chemoprophylaxis beginning a week before
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deployment reduced the probability of cases by 91% when used alone and by 98% when
coupled with vaccination. Finally, the researchers estimated that antimicrobial chemopro-
phylaxis with conventional therapies would cost under US$1 per peacekeeper, whereas the
other two pre-deployment intervention strategies would be considerably more expensive.
What Do These Findings Mean?
The accuracy of these findings is likely to be affected by the many assumptions made by the
researchers in constructing their mathematical model. In addition, further research is
needed to validate the use of rapid tests for detecting asymptomatic V. cholerae carriage, to
compare the prophylactic efficacy of different antimicrobial regimens, and to quantify the
impact of oral cholera vaccination on disease transmission from asymptomatic carriers.
Nevertheless, these findings, which are likely to be generalizable to other settings, suggest
that screening, chemoprophylaxis, and vaccination would all effectively prevent cholera
introduction during large-scale personnel deployments like the one that precipitated the
cholera outbreak in Haiti. However, although antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis is likely to
provide the greatest protection at the lowest cost, this strategy is controversial because of
increasing levels of drug resistance. Moreover, the researchers stress that proper sewage dis-
posal must be implemented in tandem with any biomedical intervention designed to limit
the risk of cholera introduction into disease-free areas by peacekeepers or other troops.
Additional Information
This list of resources contains links that can be accessed when viewing the PDF on a device
or via the online version of the article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001947.
• TheWorld Health Organization provides information about cholera in several
languages
• The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also provides information about
cholera for the public, medical professionals and travelers, specific information about
the cholera epidemic in Haiti published a year into the outbreak, and CDC videos about
defeating cholera and managing dehydration (in English, French and Spanish) are
available
• The UK National Health Service (NHS) Choices website provides information about
cholera
• Information about the UN in Haiti is available, including information on fighting
cholera in the country, a recent fact sheet about the ongoing cholera epidemic, and a
warning that cholera eradication in Haiti will take many years
• The United Nations has published the report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the
Cholera Outbreak in Haiti and its own follow-up to the panel’s policy recommendations
• The not-for-profit organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is tackling several
cholera outbreaks around the world; its website includes a 2014 report about the cholera
epidemic in Haiti
• MedlinePlus provides links to further resources about cholera
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